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Inter and Intrastate Usage of Great Lakes
Waters: A Legal Overview
by A. Dan Tarlock*
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent proposals to divert Great Lakes water out of the Basin for uses
such as western coal production or to bail out farmers who have depleted the Ogallala aquifer have caused concern among the Great Lakes
States and Canadian provinces. The diversion proposals that gave rise to
the immediate concern are temporarily in abeyance due to falling energy
prices or the costs of proposed projects. However, other regions of the
country continue to look to the Great Lakes as a source of supplemental
water. The littoral states and Ontario and Quebec have taken a first step
to respond collectively to the challenges posed to the integrity of the
lakes and the economy of the region posed by out-of-basin diversion proposals by signing the Great Lakes Charter, I but such diversion proposals
raise questions beyond the necessity for immediate responses to a specific
proposal. A long-ran and effective Great Lakes protection strategy will
require not simple anti-diversion laws, but comprehensive efforts by the
individual states and provinces to manage this great commons. The
Great Lakes must be managed in the context of all of the states' and
provinces' water resources, both in and outside the basin. Both modifications of state law and regional cooperation may be required to achieve
this objective.
This paper examines several possible Great Lakes diversion scenarios in the context of the existing law of water management in the Great
Lakes States. The first sections discuss the common law of riparian
rights, and the next section discusses legislative modifications of the common law. Diversion proposals and Great Lake States' responses to them
may involve constitutional challenges either through the exercise of the
United States Supreme Court's original jurisdiction or challenges to state
laws that prohibit or make difficult a proposed diversion. To resolve
these challenges, it will be necessary to look to the existing law of water
* Professor of Law IIT Chicago Kent College of Law.
1 Reprinted in GREAT LAKES GOVERNORS TASK FORCE, COUNCIL OF GREAT LAKES GOVERNORS, FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON WATER DIVERSION AND GREAT LAKES INsTrrunONs 40 app.III (1985). [hereinafter cited as GREAT LAKES CHARTER OR CHARTER].
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management in the Great Lakes States to begin to define their respective
rights or to measure the interests of the states in preventing diversions.
To understand the full dimensions of the "diversion issue" and possible state and regional responses, an understanding of the scope of federal water management authority and recent federal court decisions that
subject state water laws to the dormant or negative commerce clause
analysis is necessary. Sections four and five address the issues of federal
authority over the Great Lakes, constraints on state choice imposed by
the negative commerce clause and the law of equitable apportionment
and appropriate state responses to these constraints in order to maximize
state control over future claims on the lakes. The final section assesses
the major strengths and weaknesses of possible state strategies.
II.

THE COMMON LAW OF RIPARIAN RIGHTS

AND ITS IMPORTANCE

All of the littoral states of the Great Lakes initially adopted the
common law of riparian rights to assign rights to use water and continue
to do so today. The common law of water rights define both the rights of
private parties to use waters within a state and the rights of the Great
Lakes States to control the use of the lakes. Thus, the common law of
riparian rights is the starting point to understand the legal options open
to the Great Lakes States to prevent or authorize diversions from the
lakes.
Because water resources are abundant in the Great Lakes States,
there have been relatively few conflicts among consumptive users, especially among users of the Great Lakes themselves. For this reason, the
common law of water allocation consists of fragmented decisions and
statements of general principles that yield little guidance to concrete controversies. Despite its limitations, however, the common law of riparian
rights continues to structure the debate on resource use in the Midwest,
and the common law is still evolving. It has already passed through two
stages, and may be entering a third stage. In the first stage, the courts
decided the flow of the stream had to be primarily allocated among competing users. In modem terms, all riparian rights were essentially nonconsumptive. In the second, the courts decided that both non-consumptive and consumptive uses were equal and both the flow and the quantity
of stream had to be shared, but the respective rights of riparians were not
further defined. In the present stage, the courts are beginning to define
with more precision the respective rights of riparians and to promote
more efficient uses of water resources.
The common law rests on the fundamental principle that all riparians have correlative rights in common water bodies. Beyond this general
idea, the law provides little guidance on how their source should be
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shared among competing claimants, and the principal defect in the common law is its uncertainty. It is difficult to predict the fate of new uses of
water as well as the level of protection that existing uses can expect. This
uncertainty is a theoretical constraint on water use because the initiator
of use or large water resources project needs a firm property right to
support the use or project and it is a constraint on state water planning
and conservation efforts. It is difficult to estimate how water may ultimately be allocated among competing uses within a state. This uncertainty extends to efforts to define the rights of the Great Lakes States
with regard to each other and to other states outside the region. The
rights of the states to the Great Lakes are guaranteed by the doctrine of
equitable apportionment. This doctrine, which is discussed in section V,
initially looks to the common law of riparian rights to decide how resources will be shared among interested states.
In practice, water dependent activities have been undertaken because the threats of effective challenges to water use were minimal. However, to remove some of the doubts and to promote water resources
development, the common law has, to varying degrees, been modified in
many of the Great Lakes states to "firm up" water rights. However,
great uncertainty remains in the Lakes States concerning the scope of
local (state) and regional (interstate) water rights.
The common law also poses potential barriers to public control over
water allocation. The common law is primarily a law that sanctions acquisition of private rights in water, and any law of purely private rights
deprives the state of control over how water should be used. Constitutional guarantees that private property shall not be taken without due
process of law may constrain state power to reallocate resources should a
state decide to intervene in private choices.' Vested rights claims to
unexercised, as opposed to exercised, riparian rights have never blocked a
necessary reform of the common law, but the argument that the state
lacks any power to modify effectively the common law of riparian rights
is often raised. Thus, an understanding of the common law is crucial to
any debate about water use policy in the region since legislative initiatives must either modify or replace the common law. In addition,, efforts
to firm up rights to use the waters of the Great Lakes through interstate
compacts or equitable apportionment actions will be done against a background of the common law. Hence, it is important to understand what
remains and what has been changed. This section examines the most
important aspects of the common law of riparian and of groundwater
use. It is designed to illustrate the basis and scope of riparian rights so
2 The fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution prohibit the taking of
private property without due process of law. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.

104 (1978).
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the relationship among domestic law, legislative modification and interstate sharing options can be more clearly understood.
A.

The Definition of Riparian Rights

The common law of water use is the law of riparian rights. Technically, rights to use lakes are littoral rights, but for all practical purposes
the law of stream and lake use is the same. Riparian rights are usufructuary private property rights that arise through the ownership of land
abutting a stream or lake. That is, riparian rights are rights that are
limited to the use of the water in a stream or lake. Riparians do not
"own" the water of a stream or lake. There is an argument that private
riparian rights attach only to land that abuts navigable but not nonnavigable waters, but this distinction has never been recognized by courts.
Nothing need be done to perfect a riparian right; it exists by virtue of the
ownership of riparian land and may, in theory, be exercised at any time.
All riparian owners have equal rights to use the stream so that priority of
use is, in theory, irrelevant to the exercise of a right. A subsequent user
may be able to diminish the scope of a prior user's right. The common
law of riparian rights is thus the opposite of the law of prior appropriation that prevails in the ard west. Water is allocated in the order of the
acquisition of the right. First in time, first in right.
B.

The Requirement Ownership of Riparian Land

Ownership of riparian land is the principal basis of a riparian right.3
"Riparian land" is a term of art that encompasses three separate concepts. All the concepts are designed to limit the number of users who
may claim a right of access to the resource. All possible diversion scenarios propose to apply Great Lakes waters to nonriparian lands. Domestic
law will not be the sole source of law relevant to the legality of a diversion, but the common law of riparian land and the related concept of the
watershed limitation will influence the legal analysis of the different diversion scenarios. First, the land must abut the stream. This is a minimum physical contact test. All that is required is that the claimant's land
lap the watercourse at some point. There is no required ratio between
the amount of contact and the size of the tract. Riparian rights may even
be seasonable, coming and going with the water level of the stream or
lake. The second requirement is that the land meet one of the two principal tests of riparian land. The tests are the (1) source of the title or (2)
unity of title rule. The source of the title test is a rule designed to protect
the uses of other riparians on a stream or lake. This theory limits the
amount of land eligible for riparian rights. Riparian rights are confined
3 See Monroe Carp Pond Co. v. River Raisin Paper Co., 240 Mich. 279,287,215 N.W. 325,327

(1927).
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to the smallest tract of land in continuous ownership that abuts the
stream. Under this theory land may be subtracted but not added to a
riparian tract over time.' The unity of title theory judges a riparian tract
by its size at the time that a conflict with other riparians arises.' This
theory allows an owner to add nonriparian land to his tract and make it
riparian. The power to expand, however, is circumscribed by the same
reasonableness discussed below, which limits the exercise of all riparian
rights.
There has been a considerable debate about the impact of the different rules on water use. For example, prior to 1967 the Wisconsin Public
Service Commission applied the source of title rule. A study found that
this reduced by sixty-four percent the amount of land that would be classified riparian compared with the adoption of the unity of title rule, but
the magnitude of the impact of the source or chain of title rule on agricultural irrigation was difficult to determine.'
The third requirement is that the water be used not only on riparian
land but within the watershed of origin. At common law all use outside
the watershed of origin was per se unreasonable. The rule is designed to
preserve the flow available to other riparians below the place of diversion
and has been interpreted to mean that water must be used on land that
drains into streams below the place of diversion. The watershed limitation has been much criticized as ineffident7 but the basic idea that users
in the watershed of origin should be protected from transbasin diversions
is a powerful one in American water law. Western states such as California have developed sophisticated mechanisms to protect existing and future users in an area of origin from the adverse impacts of largescale
transbasin diversions.' The watershed limitation has been asserted in equitable apportionment actions to block transbasin diversions. Wisconsin
tried to stop the Chicago diversion by urging that the limitation was part
of the law of equitable apportionment, but the Supreme Court did not
reach the issue.9 The case was not a good one to test the role of the
watershed limitation in equitable apportionments actions. The case arose
before the importance of ecological considerations was realized so that
4 See, e.g. Anaheim Union Water Co. v. Fuller, 150 Cal. 327,331, 88 P. 978, 980 (1907).
5 See, e.g. Jones v. Conn, 39 Or. 30,39-41, 64 P. 855, 858-859 (1901).
6 See ELLIS, BEUSCHER, HOWARD & DEBRAAL, WATER-USE LAW AND ADMINISTRATION
IN WISCONSIN §12.04c()-(5) (1970).
7 Levi & Schneeberger, The Chain and Unity of Title Theories in DelineatingRiparian Land:
Economic AnalysisA An Alternative To Case Precedent,21 BUFFALO L. REv. 439 (1972).
8 See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10500-10507 (West 1971). See also Robie & Kletzing, Area of
OriginStatutes - The CaliforniaExperience, 15 IDAHO L. REv. 419 (1979) andAbrams, Interbasin
Transfer in a Riparian Jurisdiction,24 WM. & MARY L. REv. 591 (1983).

9 Wisconsin v. Illinois, 281 U.S. 179 (1930).
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today the watershed limitation may be more defensible as a means of
protecting the integrity of the lakes ecosystem.
Riparian rights are ordinarily claimed in natural as opposed to artificial watercourses. The status of rights in artificial water courses is not
clear and is of considerable interest in midwestern lake subdivisions.
Michigan has held that the owner of land touching an artificial watercourse that connects to a natural one obtains no riparian rights,'° but the
access can be obtained by the use of another property interest that accomplishes the same purpose but is technically not a riparian right. Access easements to the nonriparian lots can be granted. Other states
recognize that artificial water bodies treated as natural over a long period
of time may generate riparian rights.' 1
C. The Scope of Riparian Rights
What right does a riparian have to use water? Can he make a consumptive use? Can the water be used on nonriparian land? Initially the
presumptive answer to these questions was no. The rules have long been
criticized because they restrict agricultural and industrial development.
Over time, courts and legislatures expanded the scope of permitted uses
and the places where water can be used.
Originally, riparian rights were claimed by competing mill owners.
The most important attribute of the resource was the rate of flow of a
stream, and it is not surprising that courts developed rules to promote
maximum sharing of the flow among competing claimants. The rule that
was developed to allocate the flow was the natural flow rule. This rule, in
its pure form, gave each riparian a right to the natural flow unimpaired
in both quantity and quality. The rule was never a pure in situ use rule,
however. Chancellor Kent, the first commentator to state a coherent
theory of riparian rights, allowed limited diversions for domestic, agricultural and manufacturing uses. 12 However, the natural flow theory
made all impoundments and largescale diversions suspect. New England
legislatures solved some problems by the passage of Mill Dam Acts that
allowed mill owners to flood upstream lands and to compensate the riparian who suffered damage. The natural flow theory is said to require
large amounts of water to flow "unused" to the sea, and by the early
nineteenth century courts began to move away from the natural flow theory. By the end of the century most eastern states, including all the
Great Lakes States except New York, had rejected the natural flow theory in favor of a rule that is more tolerant of consumptive uses of
10

Thompson v. Enz, 379 Mich. 667, 154 N.W.2d 473 (1967).
11 Corbridge, Surface Rights in Artificial Watercourses, 24 NAT. RESOURCES J. 887 (1984).
12 3 KENT COMMENTARIES
(Michie/Law. Co-op. 1959).

558-68 (1st ed.

1828); MASS.

LAWS

ANN.

ch. 253, § 1
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water.

13

The usual judicial response to the proclaimed inefficiencies of the
natural flow theory was its rejection and the substitution of a reasonable
use rule. This rule extended the duty to share to a quantity of water in
the stream as well as the flow. The courts reasoned that since all riparian
rights are correlative, each riparian must suffer some diminution in the
quantity available in order to promote more efficient uses of water. The
reasonable use does not deny other riparians of rights to the flow of a
stream or level of a lake. It is more accurate to characterize the rule as
one that removes per se barriers to impoundments and diversions, 4 but
does not further define the correlative rights of riparians. The reasonableness of one use can only be determined in the context of other uses.
For example, in a Michigan lake level case, the court authorized a supplemental irrigator to draw down a lake one quarter of an inch as a rea-

sonable use. 15

All of the Great Lakes States have adopted the reasonable use rule,
at least in dictum. In some states, such as Michigan, acceptance of the
rule is clear.16 In other states, such as Pennsylvania, the precise rule
followed in the state is more uncertain because judicial opinions use both
theories to resolve conflicts. 7 New York courts never clearly chose between the natural flow and reasonable use theory, but most of the uncertainty was removed in 1966 when the state adopted a harmless use
statute.18 This statute requires a person who complains of a riparian or
nonriparian use to prove that the diversion or other causes harm or
would cause immediate harm. However, as in other states, the amount
of water that may be diverted remains uncertain.
The problem with the reasonable use rule is that it is in fact no rule
at all. The following statement, for example, describes Indiana law, but
it could describe the common law of all littoral states.
Each riparian owner is entitled to make a reasonable use of the
water of a watercourse consistent with the coequal right of other users
of a watercourse. What is considered to be a reasonable use is a question of fact to be determined from the facts and circumstances of each
13 The cases are collected and summarized in NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, A SUMMARY
DIGEST OF STATE WATER LAWS (R. Dewsnup & D. Jensen eds. 1973) [hereinafter cited as SUMMARY DIGEST].
14 Dumont v. Kellog, 29 Mich. 420 (1874).

Is Hoover v. Crane, 362 Mich. 36, 106 N.W.2d 563 (1960).
16 See SUMMARY DIGEST, supra note 13, at 401-403.
17 See SUMMARY DIGEST, supra, note 13, at 644.46. The situation is confused in Pennsylvania
because courts have developed hybrid natural flow and reasonable use rules. See eg., Helms v.
Zeitneff, 407 Pa. 482, 181 A.2d 277 (1962). See also T. WESTON, PENNSYLVANIA WATER RIGHTS
IN THE POTOMAC RIVER BASIN (INTERSTATE COMMISSION ON THE POTOMAC RIVER BASIN

18 See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §15-0701.1 (McKinney 1984).

1976).
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A limited degree of certainty has been incorporated into the common law by the concept of preferences. In all states, by common law or
statute, domestic uses have priority, and presumably the full amount of
available water can be used to supply domestic needs to the exclusion of
all other uses. In most states domestic uses are narrowly defined to inlude a household and subsistence agriculture,2" but in Ohio the preference extends to incorporated municipalities' water service demands. 2 In
the other states, however, most important consumptive uses are classified
as "secondary" and sharing formulae are developed on a case by case
basis through the use of an inclusive balancing test. The factors include
size, fall, volume, velocity, the nature of the use, the present and projected uses of other riparians, the extent, duration and manner of application of the use and the established usage along the stream.22 The
common law's "all things considered" balancing test has long been criticized as inefficient, and the Restatement of Torts (Second) has responded
to the argument that the common law is both uncertain and wasteful.
The new Restatement attempts to incorporate a high degree of stability
into the test. Balancing was kept in form, but the drafters managed to
incorporate prior appropriation principles into the common law of riparian rights. Section 850 of the Restatement of Torts (Second) makes "the
protection of existing values of water uses, land investments and enterprises" a factor in the balancing. 23 The addition of this factor is thought
by many to be declarative of what common law courts in fact did in
specific cases and is a major advancement over the formulation of the
abstract common law rules of water allocation.
D. The Transfer of Use of Water to Non-RiparianLand
Classic riparian law restricts riparian rights to use on riparian land.
Use on nonriparian land is per se unreasonable. This rule has been criticized as inefficient because it inhibits water from being applied to potential productive uses. Section 855 of the Restatement of Torts (Second)
recommends that the per se rule against nonriparian use be removed.2 4
A 1980 Georgia decision illustrates the potential effect of the Restatement. Pyle v. Gilbert25 holds that water may be used on nonriparian land
and that as between a downstream riparian and the nonriparian user, the
19 SUMMARY DIGEST, supra note 13, at 296.

20 See F. Arthur Stone & Sons v. Gibson, 230 Kan. 224, 630 P.2d 1164 (1981).
21 City of Canton v. Shock, 66 Ohio St. 19, 63 N.E. 600 (1902).

22 SUMMARY DIGEST, supra note 13, at 36.
23 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850 (1977).
24 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 855 (1977).

25 245 Ga. 403, 265 S.E.2d 584.

0

1986]

A LEGAL OVERVIEW

75

issue is one of reasonableness. Apparently use is another factor to be
thrown into the reasonableness hopper. This case seems to go beyond
previous cases that allowed nonriparian uses that did not cause demonstrable injury to downstream riparians.
Any claim by a state in an equitable apportionment action that
transbasin diversions should not be allowed is a common law watershed
limitation claim writ large, but the status of the water limitation in the
law of equitable apportionment remains unclear. All that is clear is that
the Supreme Court would not apply a per se rule requiring that all water
be used in the watershed of origin. Still, the existence of a watershed
limitation is evidence of the state's interest in allocating its water resources to those whom it has decided need the water most especially
when the statd can point to strong ecological and other justifications for
limiting the use of its water resources to the basin or origin. States, such
as California, that have had to undertake large transbasin diversions to
move water from surplus to shortage areas within the state, have developed more sophisticated watershed protection mechanisms. California
has an area of origin statute that gives users in the watershed from which
water is diverted some call of future uses of the water and enhanced
rights to purchase water from the diversion project. The more sophisticated the state's watershed protection policy is, the easier it is to defend
against claims of out-of-basin and out-of-state diverters.
Riparian rights may be transferred by a riparian, but the legal status
of a transfer is unclear. A riparian cannot bind other, nonconsenting
riparians by a transfer. Most courts hold that all that can be transferred
is the riparian's place in the reasonableness lottery. 6 That is, other riparians remain free to argue that the use being made by the transferee is
unreasonable. For example, should one Great Lake State, such as Wisconsin, transfer a right to divert Lake Michigan water out of the Basin,
this transfer would not bind the other littoral states. They would be free
to object that the transfer violates their state or federal common law
rights.
E.

The Common Law of Groundwater Rights

For historical reasons, the law of groundwater is allocated by a different common law regime from that applicable to surface rights. This
lack of legal integration makes it difficult to manage hydrologically related surface and subsurface supplies. For example, in many states curbs
on surface uses trigger increased groundwater withdrawals and longterm aquifer mining when more rigorous conservation may be appropriate. Ground and surface law are still different in the Great Lakes States,
26 C. MEYERS & A.D. TARLOCK, WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 2d (1980); State v.
Apfelbacher, 167 Wis. 233, 167 N.W. 244 (1918).

-
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but many states are taking some steps to integrate the two. Groundwater
rights have an indirect but potentially important role to play in the analysis of Great Lakes diversion issues. More and more courts are coming
to the realization that their allocation of a watercourse involves the allocation of all waters, surface and ground, that are part of the system. For
example, Colorado recently curtailed the exercise of groundwater rights
to fulfill its obligations to New Mexico and Texas under the Rio Grande
River Compact.27 Further, comprehensive water resource management
today means the uniform treatment of ground and surface water, and, as
will be discussed further, comprehensive management is the key to the
Great Lakes States charting their own water destiny.
The common law of groundwater classified surface water as an incident to land ownership and applied a pure rule of capture. A surface
owner could withdraw unlimited amounts for any purpose without liability to adjoining landowners whose wells were dewatered. Courts adopted
the absolute ownership rule because they did not understand underground aquifer mechanics and considered it impossible or too costly to
attempt any allocation other than capture. An early nineteenth century
Wisconsin decision carried the rule of capture or "absolute" ownership
to its logical conclusion and held that the privilege to pump extended to
malicious withdrawals.2" The rule of capture also supported the policy
that land development should be encouraged which was incorporated
into the common law generally in the nineteenth century.
American courts soon rubbed the rough edges off of the absolute
ownership rule and replaced it with the reasonable use rule. Groundwater reasonable use is different, however, from the surface reasonable
use rule because the former is not a true sharing rule. The reasonable use
rule developed in response to conflicts between farmers and cities who
sunk large well fields in rural areas and exported the water out of the
basin. To do justice to the farmers, courts put three major restrictions on
groundwater usage: (1) the use had to be on overlying land, (2) the use
had to be beneficial, that is reasonable, and (3) use on non-overlying land
was classified as per se unreasonable.2 9 These restrictions did not benefit
pumpers in a basin because among overlying owners there was no allocation inter se and capture prevailed among these pumpers. California rejected both the absolute and reasonable use rules early in this century
and dicta in a few other states approved the California approach which
27 In re the Rules and Regulations Governing the Use, Control, and Protection of Water
Rights for Both Surface and Underground Water Located in the Rio Grande and Conejos River
Basins and Their Tributaries, 191 Colo. 197, 674 P.2d 914 (1983).
28 See, e.g., Huber v. Merkel, 117 Wis. 355, 94 N.W. 354 (1903). The decision, since overruled,
was long criticized in the state. Note, The Law of Underground Water - A Half Century of Huber
v. Merkel, 1953 Wis. L. REV. 491.
29 Forbell v. City of New York, 164 N.Y. 522, 58 N.E. 644 (1900).
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applied surface riparian rules to conflicts among pumpers within a basin.
However, most states retained the reasonable use rule. This is now
changing, largely as a result of the Restatement of Torts (Second), which
imposes some limitations on in-basin pumping as well as out-of-basin exports."0 The Restatement's approach has been adopted in Michigan,
Ohio and Wisconsin. Indiana, alone among the Great Lakes States, has
rejected the Restatement approach. Groundwater legislation in Minnesota achieves the same objective and more, as discussed in the next section. More modest legislative reforms in other states also provide more
sharing than the common law rules that the legislation replaced.
The groundwater section of the Restatement incorporates the surface rules' protection of prior users into a balancing test for the express
purpose of protecting small, as against large, users. Section 858 provides:
(1) A proprietor of land or his grantee who withdraws groundwater from the land and uses it for a beneficial purpose is not subject to
liability for interference with the use of water by another, unless
(a) the withdrawal of groundwater unreasonably causes harm
to a proprietor of neighboring land through lowering the water table or
reducing artesian pressure,
(b) the withdrawal of groundwater exceeds the proprietor's
reasonable share of the annual supply or total store of groundwater, or
(c) the withdrawal of the groundwater has a direct and substantial effect upon a water-course or lake and unreasonably causes
harm to a person entitled to the use of its water.
(2) The determination of liability under clauses (a), (b) and (c) of
Subsection (1) is governed by the principles stated in 850 to 857. 3 1
The reference to section 850 sweeps in the limited prior appropriation principle discussed earlier. The comments make it clear that the
Second Restatement envisions a rule of capture among large pumpers
who enter the basin at the same time, but contemplates a rule of prior
appropriation between preexisting smaller and subsequent larger pumpers. Section 858's principal change is to extend the protection that overlying owners have enjoyed from large nonoverlying uses to include
protection from some large overlying uses as well. Wisconsin was the first
state to apply section 858, and that state's adoption of the section was
significant in light of the state's long adherence to the English rule. In
State v. Michels Pipeline Construction Co. 32 a sewage contractor dewatered the soil around a sixty-inch diameter sewer line that he was constructing, and as a result, certain landowners suffered subsidence and
decreased well capacity. Michels reversed the leading Wisconsin case
30 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 858 (1977).

31 Id.
32 State v. Michels Pipeline Constr. Co., 63 Wis. 2d 278, 217 N.W.2d 339 (1974).
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which had applied the full English rule, and adopted section 858 because
"[w]ater users with superior economic resources should not be allowed to
impose costs on smaller water users that are beyond their economic
capacity." 3 3
Michigan has also applied section 858 in a case where the extractor
would win at common law. In Maerz v. United States Steel Corp.,34 a
quarry dewatering operation caused nearby domestic wells to fail. The
Michigan Court of Appeals reversed a partial summary judgment for the
quarry owner, stating that section 858 is "more fair and just than the
English rule or lesser modifications of the English rule, and should be
followed in Michigan."3 5 The Ohio Supreme Court recently decided a
similar case and rejected the common law rule of absolute ownership in
favor of the Restatement approach. 6 An intermediate Indiana appellate
court adopted the Restatement, but the Supreme Court reversed and held
that Indiana law prohibits only malicious and gratuitous pumping so
long as the water is applied to a beneficial use.3 7 The concept of malicious pumping is well understood, but the concept of gratuitous pumping
is not. In a conflict between a large supplemental irrigator and a number
of small farmers, a federal district court equated gratuitous with wasteful
pumping and enjoined certain pumping practices as wasteful.3 8 The Seventh Circuit reversed the injunction but allowed the farmers to proceed
to trial on the damages issue.39 Therefore, the possibility that large scale
pumping that injures surrounding smaller landowners might be classified
as gratuitous remains open in Indiana.
It is important to realize that the cases adopting Restatement section 858 make only a limited change in the common law. The cases fall
far short of mandating groundwater conservation. The cases applying
section 858 also do not integrate ground and surface rights. They merely
establish equity between small and large pumpers. Nonetheless they represent a first step in the recognition of the basic principle that there is no
unlimited right to pump groundwater and that groundwater law should
be aligned with broader water conservation objectives. On a broader
level, these cases reinforce the basic principle that rights in shared resources are inherently less certain than rights in exclusive resources such
as land, and thus rights in shared resources are more vulnerable to judicial and legislative change.
33 Id. at 303, 217 N.W.2d at 351.
34 116 Mich. App. 710, 323 N.W.2d 524 (1982).
35 Id. at 720, 323 N.W.2d at 530.
36
37
38

Cline v. American Aggregates Corp., 15 Ohio St. 3d 384, 474 N.E.2d 324 (1984).
Wiggins v. Brazil Coal & Clay Corp., 452 N.E.2d 958 (Ind. 1983).
Prohosky v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 584 F. Supp. 1337, 1343, 1351 (N.D. Ind.

1984).
39

Prohosky v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 767 F.2d 387, 393-94 (7th Cir.1985).
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III.

LEGISLATIVE MANAGEMENT

The legislatures of almost every Great Lakes State have modified the
common law to some extent. The early modifications responded to a
specific problem, such as uncertainty over whether flood control and
multipurpose reservoirs could be challenged by downstream riparians.
Until recently, only Minnesota had accepted the argument that the common law should be replaced by a permit system. Wisconsin has now
adopted a strict permit system to regulate new large scale consumptive
withdrawals in and out of the Great Lakes Basin,' and other states are
considering legislation to implement the Great Lakes Charter. The
Great Lakes Charter is a cooperative regional strategy agreed to by the
eight Great Lakes governors and the premiers of Ontario and Quebec in
1985. The Charter provides for a regional water information data base,
and it has two major legal ramifications. The signatory governments
agreed to coordinate state and provincial regulatory legislation to implement the Charter and to provide a regional consultation procedure to
review all proposals to divert or to consume more than five million gallons per day of basin water. This section describes the legislative modifications of the common law of ground and surface rights that currently
exist in the Great Lakes States. Other states are beginning to consider
legislation to implement the Great Lakes Charter.
4.

ConstitutionalAuthority to Manage Water Resources

State power over water resources stems from two sources: (1) the
general police power and (2) the power to determine the ownership of
beds underlying navigable waters.4 1 The states own the beds of the Great
Lakes under the equal footing doctrine.42 State ownership of the beds of
the Great Lakes gives the littoral states an additional interest to assert
control over Great Lakes water use, although the power -to allocate all
waters within their jurisdiction is inherent in the states' quasi-sovereign
powers within the federal system. 3 Other aspects of water resources
management, such as waste assimilative capacity and recreational carrying capacity, have historically been perceived as scarce and, therefore,
management programs have been instituted to deal with these problems.
Water management for these purposes is very important in the Great
Lakes States, and these programs have an impact on water quantity considerations. This paper, however, does no more than recognize this rela40 1985 Wis. Acts 29 § 60.
41 Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324 (1876).
42 Pollard v. Hagen, 44 U.S. 212 (1845).
43 Trelease, Arizona v. California:Allocation of Water Resources to People, States and Nation,
1963 Sup. Cr. REv. 158, 166-69.
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tionship. State power to control water resources is subject to four basic
constraints:
1. State powers are subordinate to paramount federal authority.
2. Interstate waters must be shared among littoral or riparian
states by the law of equitable apportionment which is enforced by original actions in the Supreme Court.
3. State regulation is subject to federal and state constitutional
guarantees against the taking of property without due process of law.
4. The special history of navigable waters has led to the recognition of public rights, "trust" rights, that may constrain inconsistent
state allocations.
Federal constraints are covered in section IV. This section addresses the
last two constraints.
State water resource allocation usually eliminates or modifies common law riparian rights and substitutes new rights in their place. Riparians and landowners inevitably argue that any change in the common law
is a taking of property without due process of law. In addition, statutes
that require common law right holders to take some affirmative action to
preserve rights deemed to be vested before the enactment of the legislation also raise questions of procedural due process.
The determination of when a government action is or is not a taking
is one of the most intractable problems of modern jurisprudence and on
which little consensus exists. Fortunately for state regulation of water,
the issues are easier than they are with respect to land use regulation.
States that have switched to legislative property rights have usually preserved preexisting water rights to the extent that they were based on actual use rather than claims to future but undefined uses of the water.
Western water legislation that has switched from the common law to
prior appropriation or a hybrid permit system has universally been upheld against taking arguments. The issue was recently decided in Texas,
and Arizona's groundwater conservation legislation, which is designed to
shift water from agricultural to urban uses, has been held constitutional.' The Supreme Court of Washington recently held that it is reasonable to give holders of common law riparian rights fifteen years to put
them to actual beneficial use in order to preserve them against a statute
that shifted from riparian right to prior appropriation. 45 The Arizona
precedents are especially important because the Arizona legislation actu44 In re Adjudication of Water Rights in the Llano River Watershed of the Colorado River
Basin, 642 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. 1982). Town of Chino Valley v. City of Prescott, 131 Ariz. 78, 638
P.2d 1324 (1981). Accord Williams v. City of Wichita, 190 Kan. 317, 374 P.2d 578 (1962), appeal
dismissed, 375 U.S. 7 (1963) and Crookston Cattle Co. v. Minnesota Dept. of Nat. Resources, 300
N.W.2d 769 (Minn. 1980).
45 In re Deadman Creek Drainage Basin, 103 Wash. 2d 686, 694 P.2d 1071 (1985).
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ally prohibits the initiation of new groundwater uses in some areas; it
does not merely trade common law for permit rights.
B.

PlanningAuthority

A first step toward legislative modification of the common law is the
creation of a state agency with the authority to develop statewide water
plans. These plans are often inventories of existing uses, projections of
future demand and the identification of problem areas such as flood control or supply shortages. The legal effect of these statewide plans is often
nil but they can be a first step toward raising public consciousness about
water issues. Minnesota,46 New York,47 Indiana48 and Pennsylvania"
have statutes that authorize state inventories, plans, and other research
on water needs. New York's 1984 legislation is perhaps the most advanced. It authorizes the creation of a statewide water resources planning council and charges the council with the development of a state
water management strategy. Michigan has also recently implemented
the Great Lakes Charter through legislation that mandates the development of a comprehensive state water plan and specifies the relevant issues
that must be addressed by the plan."° Resource inventories and plans are
an important first step toward more comprehensive management because
they provide the factual basis for subsequent hard management choices.
Ultimately, the legal effect of these plans could become significant. As
more and more states tie withdrawal permits to plans, consistency with a
state water plan could become the deciding factor in permit application
proceedings.
C. Modification of the Common Law
The common law of riparian rights poses substantial constraints on
major impoundments and diversions because it provides the basis for an
argument that any alteration of flow is per se illegal. One of the early
forms of water rights regulation is a statute to remove constraints to allow multi-purpose project development. A 1955 Indiana statute is typical. The statute allows impoundments for irrigation and other purposes
subject to state approval. A riparian or group of riparians may impound
water for irrigation and other purposes "when the flow of the stream is in
excess of existing reasonable uses" at the time of the impoundment.5 1
46 MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 105.39, 105.391 (West 1977).
47 N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §15-1113 (McKinney 1985).

48 IND. CODE ANN. § 13-2-7-2 (West 1983).
49 32 PA. STAT. ANN. § 679.103. (Purdon Supp. 1985). A twenty volume state water plan
exists that covers the entire range of water uses.
50 Michigan Enrolled House Bill No. 4532, Aug. 2, 1985.
51 IND. CODE. ANN. § 13-2-1-3(3) (West 1983).
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Public and private hydroelectric and irrigation reservoirs were further
facilitated by confining downstream riparian rights to the normal flow of
the stream. 2The major purpose of reservoir construction in the Midwest
is for flood control. Indiana expressly authorizes flood control reservoirs
provided that riparian rights are not impaired and provides the state with
the authority to sell the stored water.53 Ohio has similar legislation to
authorize the disposal of water conservancy district reservoirs." 4 Michigan's major common law modification is the Surplus Waters Act which
allows the impoundment of flows above a state set optimum flow."5
D. Regulatory Authority
(1) Waters Regulated
Regulatory jurisdiction may be asserted broadly or narrowly state
by state. Historically, the common law classification of waters has been
fragmented, and this fragmentation may be reflected in state legislation.
Some states adhere to traditional classifications; others collapse traditional classifications in favor of more functional categories ofjurisdiction.
Minnesota is an example of the former. Minnesota subjects "all public
waters and wetlands" to state control.5 6 Public waters are defined as waters adjudicated as navigable or public by a state court or the United
States Supreme Court.5 7 The statute does not define wetlands, but it creates an elaborate procedure for the development of a county by county
inventory of public waters and wetlands. 8 Indiana has a similar broad,
functional definition of waters subject to the state's regulatory jurisdiction. The state subjects all water in any natural stream, natural lake or
other water body to state regulation. Both surface and groundwater,
which are further defined, are included in this definition. 9 Diffused surface water is the major excluded category of water. Until 1985, Wisconsin asserted state control only over surplus surface waters, "any water of
a stream which is not being beneficially used," and surface and groundwater withdrawals
for prospecting and mining, primarily for mine
60
dewatering.
Illinois asserts jurisdiction only over two classes of water, Lake
Michigan diversions, discussed elsewhere in this paper, and large public
and private groundwater withdrawals. The Water Use Act of 1983 ap52 IND. CODE. ANN. § 13-2-1-7 (West 1983).
53 IND. CODE. ANN. § 13-2-1-7(2) (West 1983).
54 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 6101.24 (Page 1977).

55 MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 281.301-.306 (West 1979).
56 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 105.38 (West 1977).

57 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 105.37(14) (West 1985).
58 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 105.391 (West 1985).

59 IND. CODE. ANN. § 13-2-1-3 (West 1983).
60 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 144.855 (West Supp. 1985).
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plies the "reasonable use rule" to groundwater withdrawals and creates a
procedure that requires private and public entities proposing to withdraw
in excess of 100,000 gallons per day to give notice to the applicable
county soil and water conservation district. Reasonable use is defined as
"the use of water to meet natural wants and a fair share for artificial
wants. It does not include water used wastefully or maliciously. ' 6 1 Ohio
regulates only the use of water from conservancy districts which have
been a major force in Ohio water resources development. 62
(2) Permit Requirements
States transform common law property rights into state created
property rights through permit systems. The usual rationale for state
permit systems is that they allow the state to exert greater control over
water use and in return create firmer property rights compared to the
common law for those who acquire a state permit. 63 In practice, how-

ever, the major use of eastern permit systems today is for data collection.
Until recently, Minnesota was the only state with comprehensive
permits for ground and surface water, but the system is still used primarily for data collection. In public utility terms, Minnesota has invested in
"standby capacity" for future emergency situations. Minnesota requires
a state permit to appropriate or use public waters. The state has established minimum withdrawals and withdrawals below that rate are exempt from the requirement."4 Minnesota's statute is not a classic prior
appropriation regime, despite the use of the term "appropriate." Beyond
the collection of data, its long range function is to provide a basis to
allocate waters should conflicts occur. The crucial decision, the standards to choose among competing claimants, has been left to administrative regulation. The statute creates five classes of priorities among
permits which range from domestic use to industrial, commercial, and
other uses.6" Technically these priorities are preferences that must be
used to rank competing applications. Beyond this allocation mechanism,
the statute provides no guidance about how water should be shared
among permit holders in times of shortage. Eastern states have been influenced by several model water codes that prefer administrative allocation in times of shortage to the western state model of allocation by
61 Water Use Act of 1983, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 5, §§ 1601-1607 (1983).
62 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1601.24 (Page 1977).
63 See Ausness, Water Rights Legislation in the East: A Programfor Reform, 24 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 547 (1983) and Ausness, Water Use Permits in a Riparian State: Problemsand Proposals,66
KY. L.. 191 (1977-78).
64 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 105.41 (West 1977 & Supp. 1985).
65 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 105.410)(a) (West 1977 & Supp. 1985).
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preestablished property rights.6 6 Thus, it is not surprising that allocation
among permit holders does not seem to be the principal function of the
statute. The legislation does contemplate shortages, but it deals with
them as shortterm emergencies. The statute authorizes public authorities
to promulgate rules to allocate water in times of drought.6 7
Increasingly, states are beginning to integrate environmental considerations into traditional state water allocation schemes. Minnesota, for
example, provides a series of restrictions on use designed to preserve minimum flows and lake levels throughout the state. For example, protection elevations may be set for waterbasins and all permits to appropriate
water from designated trout streams are temporary.68
New York requires all new sources of potable water supply, multipurpose projects and agricultural irrigation to obtain a permit. The state
has extensive authority to approve, deny or condition permits. For example, it may consider watershed protection issues in deciding whether
to issue a permit. 69 The state has a long and active regulatory tradition
in administering this statute.
Groundwater regulation in the Great Lakes States displays the same
diversity as does surface water regulation. At the present time, only
Minnesota has a statute that resembles a comprehensive permit program,
but other states are beginning to impose restrictions on large withdrawals
with substantial drawdown effects in the surrounding area.
In Minnesota, groundwater withdrawal permits are subject to standards that more closely resemble but still fall short of classic prior appropriation. Areas are divided between those in which adequate
groundwater data exist and those in which they do not. More data is
required from permit applicants in the latter, Class B, areas.70 Minnesota has applied the same rule for groundwater use that many western
states use. The state restricts entry into the basin, but once a pumper is
allowed in, the law does not further allocate the available supply among
pumpers. No permit may be issued unless an adequate supply is available and well levels for wells in the vicinity constructed in accordance
with state codes are not reduced.
Typically, eastern and midwestern states do not regulate all withdrawals above a minimum amount, but regulate only withdrawals in
emergency situations. These statutes are a perfect example of the theory
that most important legislation is a direct response to a specific crisis.
Restricted use groundwater areas may be declared in Indiana where "the
66 See Sax, A Model State Water Act For GreatLakes Management, 18 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L
L. 237 (1986).
67
68
69
70

MINN. STAT. ANN. § 105.418 (West Supp. 1985).
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 105.417(4) (West Supp. 1985).
N.Y. ENVTL.CONSERV. LAW 15-1113 (McKinney 1985).
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 105.416 (West Supp. 1985).
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withdraw of groundwaters exceeds or threatens to exceed its natural re."I' A special law for two counties in northern Indiplenishment ...
ana with center-pivot irrigation was passed in 1982 and became the basis
for an order reducing irrigation withdrawals in the summer of
1984. 72The special legislation was repealed in 1985 and replaced by a
procedure that now allows a groundwater emergency to be declared in
any area of the state. If an emergency is declared, restrictions may be
ordered on wells in excess of 100,000 gallons per day. Wisconsin, as previously discussed, regulates surface and groundwater withdrawals for
mining.
E. Out-of-State or Basin Diversions
The Great Lakes have passed a number of first-order responses to
the possibility of out of state or basin diversions. The responses vary from
a virtual ban on exports to legislation permitting out of state diversions
under rigorous conditions. Indiana passed a statute in 1984 that prohibits the diversion of water from the Lake Michigan Basin unless the Governor of each Great Lakes State consents.7 3 Minnesota officially
discourages out of state uses. In 1983 the legislature amended the water
act to prohibit state approval of an out-of-state ground or surface diversion unless there is a finding that there is sufficient water in the state to
meet the state's water resources needs during the life of the project and
the legislature approves the diversion.7 4 New York requires a permit for
out-of-state diversions but the statute contains no criteria for evaluating
the merits of any proposed diversion. Illinois, as mentioned, regulates
the diversion of water out of the Lake Michigan Basin. The primary
function of this regulation is to comply with the decree in the Lake Michigan diversion case. Wisconsin's new water management legislation is
designed primarily to give the state maximum possible leverage over outof-basin diversion proposals, and other states are moving in the same
directior.
IV.

FEDERAL POWER OVER THE GREAT LAKES

The federal government could probably do anything it wants with
the Great Lakes, from draining them to reestablishing a sea in the Great
Basin in Idaho, Nevada, and Utah to dedicating their use exclusively to
the Great Basin States, the rights of Canada and Ontario and Quebec
aside. The real issues are not, however, on what Congress could do but
71 IND. CODE. ANN.

§ 13-2-2.5.2-12 (West 1985).

72 See Tarlock, Supplemental GroundwaterIrrigation Law: From Capture to Sharing, 73 Ky.

L.J. 1, 25 (1986).
73 IND. CODE. ANN. § 13-2-1.9 (West 1982).
74 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 105.405 (West 1977 & Supp. 1985).
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what it has done and is likely to do. Such a bald statement of federal
power, however, is useful to focus on the sources and scope of federal
authority.
A.

Source of FederalAuthority

It is a fundamental premise of United States constitutional law that
the national government must find the authority to legislate or act within
the enumerated powers of the Constitution. This theory prevails today
in form but the Supreme Court and most constitutional lawyers have
come to accept the argument that the Constitution intended a broad delegation of authority to Congress within the areas of national rather than
local interest. The regulation of access to and the use of interstate waters
has long been recognized as a matter of national concern. The enumerated power on which most federal regulation of water rests is the commerce power. Other sources of authority such as the spending, war and
treaty powers have been used to support federal activity, but today the
commerce clause alone is an adequate basis for all direct federal regulation of the Great Lakes. The federal government can also assert its influence through the approval of interstate compacts.
The use of the commerce clause to regulate water resources allocation is now virtually without limitation, but some understanding of the
history of the evolution of this power is necessary to understand the current scope of federal power. The Constitution gives Congress the power
to regulate commerce among the several states. Historically, congressional power over water resources was restricted to the protection of navigation. Federal power originally was confined to tidal waters and later
extended to waters that were links in the chain of interstate commerce. 75
Federal power over the Great Lakes has never been in doubt after the
Supreme Court extended federal jurisdiction to fresh as well as tidal waters in the mid-nineteenth century,7 6 but tributaries to interstate waters
that have or can sustain marginal commercial navigation were the source
of much litigation, and exercises of federal authority over these waters
continue to be challenged today.
In the last forty-five years Congressional power over water resources
has been expanded to be coextensive with the full commerce power. The
full reach of the commerce clause is exemplified by a 1963 Supreme
Court decision confirming congressional power to allocate interstate wa75 The development of federal jurisdiction, which is now thought to be based on an overly
narrow reading of English common law, is traced in MacGrady, The Navigability Concept in the
Civil and Common Law: Historical Development, Current Importance, And Some Doctrines That

Don't Hold Water, 3 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 511 (1975).
76 See The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 433 (1851).
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ters among riparian or littoral states." This can be done directly by a
congressional apportionment, as the Supreme Court held was done on
the Colorado and, or by approval of an interstate compact.7 8 The Court
currently has an original action petition by the State of South Dakota
which alleges that there is a congressional apportionment of the waters
in the Oahe Reservoir as a result of the 1944 Pick-Sloan
impounded
79
Act.

Congress has seldom chosen to exercise the full scope of its authority. Federal regulation of the Great Lakes was long limited to the promotion and protection of their historic primary use, commercial
navigation, although since the 1970's federal efforts have been expanded
to the promotion of water quality. The federal government has established navigation rules for the states and has established mechanisms to
screen potential interferences with navigation. The historic limitations
on congressional power remain significant because they are incorporated
into federal statutes such as the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, which
controls the United States Army Corps of Engineers' jurisdiction over
the use of navigable waters. The current exercise of congressional power
over navigable waters makes the federal government an important player
in any Great Lakes diversion proposal. The government currently asserts no direct domestic interest in the allocation of the Great Lakes, but
any diversion project will have to be screened as a navigation impairment. The precise scope of federal review of the nonnavigation impacts
of a proposed structure in a navigable waterway is undefined but the necessity of a federal permit gives the permit-granting agency a powerful
handle on diversion proposals. Recent cases confirm the Corps' discretion to consider the indirect water quantity impacts of alterations in a
watercourse. The Great Lakes are both domestic and international waters. All statements about domestic federal power must be qualified by
any international obligations that it has to Canada by the Boundary Waters Treaty and international law generally.
The main screening mechanisms are the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of Rivers and Harbors and section 404 of the Clean Water
Act. The 1899 Act gives the Corps of Engineers the authority to approve
structures in navigable waters. The Clean Water Act gives the Corps
(with EPA approval) the power to review dredge and fill proposals. This
gives the federal government an important handle on any diversion efforts because the intake structure must be approved by the federal government. The Rivers and Harbors Act was the basis on which the
federal government was able to enjoin the Sanitary District of Chicago
77 Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
78 Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554 (1983).
79 South Dakota v. Nebraska, - U.S. -, 106 S. Ct. 305 (1985)(mem.).
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from withdrawing Lake Michigan water in excess of amounts approved
by the Secretary of War.8" Federal jurisdiction under the Rivers and
Harbors Act is circumscribed by the historic test of navigability. This
standard does not limit U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' authority over
the Great Lakes or any major tributaries, but it does limit their power
over modifications of smaller, inland waterways. Section 404 jurisdiction, by contrast, is much broader. 8 Section 404 authorizes the Corps of
Engineers to issue permits for the discharge of dredged or fill material
into "the waters of the United States." Federal jurisdiction under section
404 extends to wetlands in addition to small inland lakes and rivers.8 2
Section 404 is an important federal handle over a variety of activities that
can affect water quantity and quality. For example, land development
activities in defined wetlands require a section 404 permit.8"
In addition to section 404 jurisdiction over general dredge and fill,
two other acts impose special fisheries resources protection duties on the
Corps of Engineers. The Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act requires
consultation with the Fish and Wildlife Service although the duties of the
agency, other than to listen with respect to the biologists, are not clear.
If, however, a project affects the survival or the habitat necessary for
survival, of a listed endangered or threatened species, the Endangered
Species Act requires that agency to take actions to preserve the species.
This requires water project managers to operate projects in such a way
that a threatened or endangered species is brought back from the brink of
extinction.8 4 The Endangered Species Act triggers expansive section 404
duties when a project for which a permit is required may threaten the
survival of a species by depriving it of adequate water. 85 The recent decision imposing expansive species protection duties on the Corps of Engineers is an important national precedent because the case holds that the
Corps of Engineers must now consider the downstream quantity as well
as quality impacts of a proposed diversion. 6
Federal screening of structures and other activities that may effect
the navigable capacity of the Great Lakes may give the federal government a veto over any major diversion project. Thus, a diversion project
may not proceed without some sort of affirmative federal authorization.
The necessity for either administrative or legislative approval, in effect,
gives the Basin States a veto over any major diversion project since federal power must be exercised with regard to its effect on interested states.
80 Sanitary District of Chicago v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925).
81 See Minnehaha Creek Watershed Dist. v. Hoffman, 597 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1979).

82 United States v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1979).
83 Avoyelles Sportmen's League v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1983).
84 Carson Truckee Conservancy Dist. v. Clark, 741 F.2d 257 (9th Cir. 1984).
85 Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 758 F.2d 508 (10th Cir. 1985).
86 Id.
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Once the federal government exercises the commerce power, inconsistent state laws may be preempted. In the era of judicial expansion of
federal authority, 1940-1960s, the Court erected a conclusive presumption that congressional exercise of the commerce power evidenced an intent to preempt state law despite statutes that seemed to require
deference to state law. The era of automatic deference to federal authority ended however, in a 1978 Supreme Court decision interpreting the
Reclamation Act of 1902.17 Section eight preserves state law relating to
the "control, appropriation, use or distribution of water" used in irrigation."'8 8 The Court held that section eight requires that the federal government operate a proposed project in a manner consistent with state law
unless so doing would frustrate the objectives of the project.89 California
v. United States is consistent with the Court's current attitude toward
federal preemption. Recent cases require a high showing that state law is
inconsistent with federal objectives, 90 and therefore the case may have
implications beyond the arid West. Recent cases may signal a judicial
willingness to tolerate more state control of federal projects unless Congress affirmatively decides that state control is too costly and inconsistent
with the federal objectives.
These cases have no immediate applicability to likely state efforts to
protect the Great Lakes. However, these decisions may give states more
control over the allocation of their resources against other federal regulatory agencies such as FERC which licenses hydroelectric facilities. 91
More generally they underline the principle that the Great Lakes States
should have the first option to control the allocation of this commons,
and any decision that littoral state allocation is inconsistent with the "national interest" should come after a full congressional debate.
The federal government has two main options when it chooses to
allocate the rights to interstate waters. These are:
1. Legislation
2. Approval of a State Compact
Both of these options would require affirmative congressional action.
The first would require the formulation of a Great Lakes diversion policy. Congress could either delegate the basic allocation choices to the
Great Lakes States or make them itself. The substantive choices are
many. Congress could legislate an area of origin protective scheme that
87
88
89
90

California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
Id. at 675.
Id. at 674.

See eg., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. California St. Energy Res. Conserv. and Dev. Comm.,
461 U.S. 190 (1983), and Arkansas Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm., 461 U.S. 375
(1983).
91 See Wolfe, Hydropower FERC Licensing and Emerging State-Federal Water Rights Conflicts, 29 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 851 (1984).

CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.

Vol. 18:67

would prohibit diversions, subject diversions to cost/benefit criteria, give
the basin states a veto over proposed diversions or provide compensation
to the state of export or all of the Basin States. The option has potential
benefits to the Great Lakes States as well as costs. For example, legislation that prohibited diversions objected to by Basin States would remove
the major obstacle to state diversion regulation. However, if the issue is
opened to national debate, potential "user" states might insist on a federal diversion policy that would downgrade the role of the Great Lakes
States. The second option, an interstate compact, is discussed in the next
section.
V.

STATE OPTIONS

This section surveys a range of Great Lakes protection strategies
that may be open to the states. All possible strategies from the "reasonable and successful" to the "unreasonable and unlikely to be successful"
are displayed and discussed so that decisionmakers will have a better idea
of the range of choice open to them and the legal and other constraints
that may circumscribe a given choice.
A.

Export Embargos

A state could enact a simple law that forbids the export of surface or
groundwater from the Great Lakes. The objective of such a law would
be to reserve the Great Lakes for the littoral states exclusively. Indiana
has virtually done this by a statute that prohibits exports unless all Great
Lakes governors agree. Export prohibitions have great political appeal
and are relatively easy to enact, but they are presumptively unconstitutional after Sporhase v. Nebraska, which subjects state water allocation
choices to the dormant or negative commerce clause.9 2 Export prohibitions are intended to discriminate against interstate commerce, and
therefore alone they offend the fundamental policies underlying the dormant or negative commerce clause. Thus, export prohibitions are not an
effective strategy as they are unconstitutional and deprive the states of
any control over Great Lakes diversions.
Sporhase has had such a substantial impact on state water resource
protection strategies that an extended discussion of the case and its implications is warranted in order to understand the extent to which state
water allocation choices are now circumscribed by federal law. Federal
authority over state water allocation has recently been indirectly asserted
by the federal judiciary through the application of the dormant or negative commerce clause. This is a reactive assertion of federal power because the dormant or negative commerce clause only applies to suits
92 See Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 958-960 (1982).
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brought by a party challenging a state law. The impact of this assertion
of federal authority will be uneven, and less comprehensive and less fair
than an affirmative act of Congress. Nonetheless, the threat of a law suit
can have a substantial impact on the exercise of state legislative and administrative power. The Supreme Court's extension of the dormant or
negative commerce clause to water has caused great concern among the
states because many water laws and policies that explicitly prefer in-state
users may be unconstitutional or at least subject to judicial challenge.
That the negative or dormant commerce clause could be applied to
western groundwater came as a great surprise to the western states.93
They had long thought themselves immune from the dormant or negative commerce clause because they claimed to own their waters in "trust"
for the public. State declarations of trust are no more than declarations
of the police power inherent in every state, but the states sincerely believed, with some precedential justification, that state ownership immunized their water laws from dormant or negative commerce clause
scrutiny. An early Supreme Court opinion Hudson County Water Co. v.
McCarter9 4 held that state ownership in trust immunized legislation that
would otherwise discriminate against interstate commerce from invalidation. In that case Justice Holmes applied the earlier holding, but not the
reasoning, to water. He sustained a New Jersey export ban on the broad
principle that the state's interest in water allocation allowed it to prefer
its own citizens to those of other states.
[F]ew public interests are more obvious, indisputable and independent of particular theory than the interest of the public of a state
to maintain the rivers that are wholly undiminished, except by such
may permit for
drafts upon them as the guardian of the public welfare
95
the purpose of turning them to a more perfect use.
Justice Holme's theory was fatally flawed from the start. The "ownership in trust" theory was originally invoked by the states as fiction for
the police power in an era when state regulation of the acquisition of
property was seriously debated. Now the negative commerce clause is
directed precisely against the use of state police power to distort interstate markets in the name of a higher local public interest. Soon after
Hudson County, with Mr. Justice Holmes dissenting, the Court held that
a natural gas embargo was unconstitutional and laid down the basic theory that the Court continues to follow today: The national common
market must be protected from economic balkanization.9 6
States continued to argue that trust resources that had not yet been
at 945-954.
94 Hudson City Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
95 Id. at 356.
96 Oklahoma v. Kansas Nat. Gas. Co., 221 U.S 229, 260-61 (1911). The most recent in the long
93 Id.
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reduced to private ownership, as opposed to oil and gas that had been
produced, were not articles in interstate commerce. In 1979, the Court
rejected decisively the trust theory as applied to game9 7 and laid to rest
the distinction between owned and unowned resources as a basis for negative commerce clause immunity.
Hughes was applied to water in Sporhase v. Nebraska. A farmer
whose land straddled Colorado and Nebraska wanted to withdraw water
from his Nebraska land and apply it to land across the border. The rub
was that Nebraska required a permit to export water and one of the statutory requirements was that the host state have a reciprocal export privilege. For good reasons, Colorado groundwater law had no reciprocity.
Colorado, in contrast to Nebraska, has a stringent law of groundwater
use to conserve its share of the Ogallala aquifer.
The Nebraska Supreme Court upheld the permit requirement by
concluding that the dormant or negative commerce clause did not apply
to Nebraska groundwater. Since the state followed a unique mix of correlative and reasonable use rules to allocate water, and since many statements in the Nebraska cases seemed to restrict groundwater use to
overlying land, the state supreme court construed Nebraska law as limiting use to overlying land. Therefore, groundwater was not a marketable
commodity and there was no discrimination against interstate commerce.
In a 7-2 opinion the United States Supreme Court reversed.
Sporhase held that groundwater is a commodity in interstate commerce,
regardless of state rules of ownership. Furthermore, state efforts to prefer in-state residents must pass judicial muster under the Supreme
Court's balancing test used to determine if the state law is an unreasonable restraint on interstate commerce. The result is correct but the
Court's reasoning is less than clear.
For this inquiry, however, the Court's reasoning is less important
than the -result. State water laws that prefer in-state residents are now
subject to the Court's two-tiered constitutionality test. Facially discriminatory legislation is almost conclusively presumed unconstitutional. The
state has a very high, if not impossible, burden of showing that (1) the
state's interest outweighs the traditional federal interests in a free national common market, and that (2) the state used the least intrusive
means to achieve this interest. Non-facially discriminatory legislation
must meet a balancing test. The test gives more weight to countervailing
state interests, but still weighs federal interests heavily. It asks whether
the state regulation is the least intrusive means, in terms of a burden on
line of cases striking down energy resource embargos is New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire,
455 U.S. 331 (1982).
97 Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 332 (1979).
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interstate commerce, available to achieve its means. Most crude protectionist legislation will fail under either test.
Although it seems clear that courts will invalidate straight export
bans, there is respectable scholarly argument that Sporhase is wrong.
The eminent western water lawyer, Frank J. Trelease, argues that courts
should recognize a distinction between appropriated and unappropriated
water; that is between water allocated and unallocated. Sporhase should
not, he argues, apply to unallocated water because states are deprived of
sovereignty over a vital resource: "Unless a state can deny an application
for export, it has no way to exact a quid pro quo that equals or exceeds
the opportunity costs of lost instate development." 9 8 Ultimately this argument savors too much of the tenth amendment, which the Court has
declared unenforceable, 9 9 to offer much hope to states experimenting
with simple export bans.
In addition to this argument, Sporhase did suggest a limited defense
of export bans. Justice Stevens opined that a demonstrably arid state
might be able to demonstrate that it had a shortage and thus required all
of its water to supply its inhabitants. This defense in all likelihood cannot be invoked by the Great Lakes States for two reasons. First, no state
in the region is demonstrably arid; they are demonstrably humid. Second, the defense has been narrowed to the point of nonexistence. The
Supreme Court has not yet heard a case that requires it further to define
Sporhase, but an important federal district court decision has done so.1°°
To fight off an ongoing effort by El Paso, Texas, to export groundwater
from New Mexico to Texas, New Mexico tried to justify an export prohibition statute (since repealed) by "proof' that the state will suffer a statewide water shortage in the future because of out-of-state exports. A
district court rejected the demonstrably arid defense as inconsistent with
the policies of the dormant or negative commerce clause.10 1 Only if a
state could prove that there was an imminent shortage of water for
health and safety needs as opposed to economic needs might the defense
be valid. No state, arid or humid, will ever experience water shortages of
this magnitude. The conclusion that one must draw from El Paso I is
that courts are likely to equate state conservation arguments with assertions of state sovereignty or "ownership."
There are, however, many issues about the relationship between
state quasi-sovereign interests and the dormant or negative commerce
clause that are yet to be resolved. Justice Steven's opinion in Sporhase
98 Trelease, State Water Law and State Lines: Commerce in Water Resources, 56 COLO. L.
REv. 347 (1985).
99 Garcia v. San Antonio Metrop. Transit Auth. 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
100 City of El Paso v. Reynolds, 563 F. Supp. 379 (D.N.M. 1983)[hereinafter cited as El Paso
101 Id.
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recognized, but did not fully articulate, the principle that states have a
higher interest in the allocation of their water resources than in the allocation of commodities such as oil, gas and coal which have traditionally
been allocated by interstate markets. The major relevant unresolved issue of interest to the Great Lakes State is the weight to which the Court
would give to a state environmental interest in deciding whether an antidiversion statute serves a compelling state interest. There is some precedent for the argument that courts will tolerate a high degree of interference with interstate commerce in the interests of environmental
protection.
Hitorically, state environmental statutes were thought to be immune from the dormant or negative commerce clause. State quarantine
laws were upheld against dormant or negative commerce clause challenges and there was some suggestion that the immunity extended to environmental protection generally. However, in City of Philadelphia v.
New Jersey,1°2 the Court invalidated a statute banning the import of outof-state wastes, and federal circuit courts have applied this analysis to
state efforts to protect themselves from environmental hazards through
import bans. 0 3 These cases make it harder for states to defend state
environmental statutes that discriminate against interstate commerce
from a dormant or negative commerce clause attack. But they do not
foreclose the possibility that a state could demonstrate that, in the case of
the Great Lakes, the only way to maintain
the ecological integrity of the
°4
system was to preserve the status quo.'
B. Even-Handed Application of Restrictions
The major issue raised by Sporhase is the extent to which the court
will invalidate state regulatory and conservation schemes that are applied
equally to in and out-of-state users. All state laws that regulate use are
based ,on the assumption that the primary beneficiaries of the state's
bounty will be state residents. All state regulatory schemes limit access
to available supplies to some extent. Otherwise why regulate? There is a
strong argument that so long as in-and out-of-state users may compete
equally for the supply, there is no discrimination against interstate commerce. The issue, however, is not that simple, since a state could devise
an anti-export strategy in the form of even-handed use restrictions. Judicial scrutiny might still be triggered as courts will look behind seemingly
nondiscriminatory legislation when a discriminatory effect is proved and
102 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
103 Seee.g., Illinois v. General Elec. Co., 683 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1982) (Illinois cannot bar the

disposal of nuclear wastes in the state that were generated out-of-state while allowing the disposal of
instate generated wastes).
104 See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
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when there is some question about discriminatory motive. Since a court
has some discretion to probe the motives behind legislation alleged to be
discriminatory, a state cannot cloak a discriminary purpose in a seemingly neutral regulation and expect the legislation to be upheld without
question. To be useful, this option would require state legislation, like
Wisconsin's, that subjects all users to equal and substantial conservation
restrictions.
The objective of post-Sporhase legislation is to develop a state water
allocation strategy that is consistent with the dormant or negative commerce clause. This may not be possible in some states. Since both in and
out-of-state users would be subject to equal restrictions, such legislation
tends to be more politically controversial. The benefit of this option is
that state allocation discretion is preserved; the cost is that it may be
politically impossible either to pass the legislation or to run an effective
regulatory program.
The recent efforts of New Mexico to negotiate around Sporhase to
maintain control over the future allocation of its groundwater illustrate
some of the possible ranges of post-Sporhase strategies. A groundwater
basin in southeastern New Mexico was selected by El Paso, Texas, as the
source of future supplies for the rapidly growing city. El Paso estimated
that local supplies will start to become inadequate around 1995 and it
filed for a number of New Mexico appropriative groundwater rights to
meet its anticipated needs. New Mexico's simple anti-export statute was
held unconstitutional immediately after Sporhase. New Mexico responded to Sporhase and El Paso's pending water rights application by
enacting a new statute that authorizes the state engineer to grant applications for out-of-state uses subject to statutory standards. The new statute
was tested in the second round of the litigation.10 5 El Paso II has both
good and bad news for states experimenting with legislation that gives instate users a strong preference to use its waters. The court held that parts
of the statute were constitutional and parts were not.
The good news is that the court upheld the even-handed requirement that the state engineer consider the "conservation of water within
the state" in granting permits. El Paso argued that this requirement discriminated against out-of-state users because it effectively denied them
access, but the court held that the standard was constitutional because
the state had a history of public interest review of new appropriations. In
short, the court warned New Mexico that it had to play the pending
administrative proceedings straight and apply the same standards to inand out-of-state permit applicants. This holding provides some basis for
concluding that the state's power to make fundamental allocation choices
105
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is not impaired by Sporhase. For example, state withdrawals or reservations of water from consumptive use to preserve minimum in-stream
flows would seem to be constitutional because the state interest is high
and in-and out-of-state residents are equally denied access to the resource. The dormant or negative commerce clause need not be applied
to require that all the state's resources be put on the auction block; it
merely prohibits the state from discriminating once it makes the decision
to allow the acquisition of private rights.
The court expressly held that once the taint of protectionist motive
is removed from legislation, a state may exercise its police power to prefer its own citizens in the distribution of the resource. 10 6 There is, of
course, a tension between the recognition of a preference for in-state
users and the policies underlying the dormant or negative commerce
clause that cannot be avoided by characterizing legislation as either protectionist or non-protectionist. Sporhase itself recognized the historic
preference, but its scope has barely begun to be delineated so too much
cannot be read into El Paso 11.
New Mexico's new legislation was held partially unconstitutional
because it required that the state engineer consider six criteria in out-ofstate transfer applications that he was not required to consider for instate applications. Strict scrutiny was triggered by the facial discrimination, and the statute was invalidated because out-of-state users were required to shoulder the entire burden of furthering state conservation.
This is a burden that the Constitution requires all users to share equally.
The deeper lesson of El Paso I is that the exercise of state power to
make long term and fundamental allocation choices must be based on
more than assertions of a strong state interest. The necessity to preserve
the Union through the prevention of economic discrimination places
some burden on states to justify preferring in to out-of-state users. The
state must initiate a process that forces them to face the hard choices
about water allocation and to begin to make those choices. The Arizona
Ground Water Management Act07 is a example of such legislation. Arizona has made the decision to phase out economically unsound irrigated
agriculture and to hold all water users to progressively higher water conservation duties. Its house is in order and there is less need for judicial
intervention to oversee its water policy.
C. Equitable Apportionment
In 1907 the Supreme Court asserted original jurisdiction over suits
between states for the apportionment of interstate waters. Original jurisdiction is the only constitutional avenue of relief for states, absent an
106 Id.
107 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 45-401 to 45-637 (West Supp. 1985).

1986]

A LEGAL OVERVIEW

express agreement, to vindicate their interests in interstate waters. The
limited powers of the states in a federal system requires a federal common law of interstate waters.10 8 Thus, states may assert their quasi-sovereign interests in interstate waters within their borders by suing parens
patriae, to represent the interests of all the citizens of the state, in the
Supreme Court's original jurisdiction.
An equitable apportionment is the result of the Supreme Court's
exercise of original jurisdiction. A state must fie an original action in the
Supreme Court, and the Court must accept jurisdiction. The objective is
to secure a decree that quantifies the respective rights of the states. The
major benefit is that a state now knows what share of the waters it is
entitled to and what share belongs to other states, and may plan accordingly. The disadvantage is that the Court will not exercise its jurisdiction
until it is absolutely necessary to resolve a dispute among states. This
makes equitable apportionment an unlikely short run strategy for the
Great Lakes States. However, an understanding of the law is important
because it influences other strategies.
Each state has a federal common law right to use interstate waters
to the exclusion of other states, but the right, especially in riparian jurisdictions, is even more uncertain than common law riparian rights. The
Court has articulated the theory that all states have an equal right to use
the shared resources, 10 9 but the decided cases do not allow a state to
predict how its "equal" right will prevail against competing "equal"
claims by other states. The Court has historically been reluctant to exercise its jurisdiction without a high showing of injury by a state affected by
a use or a proposed use. These are vague standards, and the Court has
expressed a preference for interstate compacts as a means of sharing interstate waters. Fear of what the Court might decree has stimulated
many states to compromise their interests and enter into a compact. As
a result, the standards for apportionment have remained general and it
remains difficult for a state to estimate the amount of its share or its
ability to stop a diversion for use in another state in advance of litigation.
And, there is a Catch-22: a state cannot bring an equitable apportionment action until the threat of deprivation of its fair share is relatively
clear.
In trying to resolve the tension between exclusive state claims of
sovereignty and the correlative rights of other states, it is not surprising
that after announcing the principle of equality among states, the Court
tried to accommodate these inconsistent state interests through extensive
use of procedural barriers. The ripeness barrier, for example, attempts to
108 This analysis is adapted from Tarlock, The Law ofEquitableApportionment Revisited, Updated and Restated, 56 COLo. L. REv. 381 (1985).
109 See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
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resolve a tension between the Court's historic reluctance to exercise its
jurisdiction in the absence of a sharply focused dispute and the recognition that states need to have their rights defined in advance of taking
specific actions. State police power over water resources extends to the
protection of future allocation options. A state suing parens patriae is
not simply another right holder claiming that the proposed diversion will
interfere with the exercise of a prior right. The police power encompasses the power to anticipate the risks to present and future in-state
users presented by out-of-state diversions and to try to minimize them
before actual harm occurs by asserting that the diversion exceeds the diverter's fair share of the river. The problem with this logic is that if it
were carried to its conclusion, downstream states would have a virtual
veto over an upstream state's diversions. This would destroy the principle of equality among states announced in Kansas v. Colorado. The concept of ripeness, derived from the equity doctrine of imminent
irreparable harm, has been used to set high standards of proof of injury
and to dismiss many apportionment actions because the initiating state
failed to prove sufficient injury. The ripeness doctrine performs the same
function as the vague standards. Both encourage the use of interstate
compacts. In a series of cases beginning in 1906, the Court developed
this concept to screen apportionment actions.
Missouri v. Illinois"' was the first case to set a high standard of
injury as a prerequisite to Supreme Court relief. In an epic environmentally unsound public works project, Illinois reversed the flow of the Chicago River to flush Chicago's sewage into the Illinois River, a tributary
of the Mississippi, instead of treating and discharging it into its front
yard - Lake Michigan. Alarmed, Missouri sued to protect the health of
residents of St. Louis and other riparian cities. Missouri invoked the
common law rule that a riparian had a right to the flow of a stream
unimpaired in quality and quantity. To dismiss Missouri's suit, a higher
standard of proof than would be applied to a suit for equitable relief between private parties was articulated: "Before this Court ought to intervene the case should be of serious magnitude, clearly and fully proved,
and the principle applied should be one which the Court is prepared de11
liberately to maintain against all considerations on the other side." '
Relief was not warranted on the facts.
The Court applied Missouri v. Illinois in 1931 when it dismissed
Connecticut's attempt to prevent a Massachusetts transbasin diversion to
benefit Boston."' Connecticut relied on the strict common law rule that
all uses outside of the watershed were per se unreasonable, but the Court
110 200 U.S. 496 (1906).
H1 Id. at 521.
112 Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1931).
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found at least three reasons to dismiss the action. Connecticut, the lower
riparian state, failed to prove any injury and thus the case arguably fell
within the more "modem" common law rule that only transwatershed
diversions that actually caused injury to downstream riparians were actionable. Connecticut is an important precedent because it illustrates
that the Supreme Court will not adopt the common law of riparian rights
as the sole basis for an equitable apportionment."' The restrictive rules
of water usage inherent in the common law violate that principle of
equality of access which the Court has consistently tried to follow.
Although the Court has been quite consistent in its reluctance to
exercise original jurisdiction where ripeness is not demonstrated, there
have been and continue to be dissenters. In his opinion in Nebraska v.
Wyoming,114 Justice Douglas took the occasion to articulate his view,
over a strong dissent, that if all claims, perfected or not, on a stream
exceed the dependable flow then a conflict exists and injury should be
presumed:
What we have then is a situation where three States assert against a
river, whose dependable natural flow during the irrigation season has
long been over-appropriated, claims based not only on present uses but
on projected additional uses as well. The various statistics with which
the record abounds are inconclusive in showing the existence or extent
of actual damage to Nebraska. But we know that deprivation of water
in arid or semi-arid regions cannot help but be injurious. If this were
an equity suit to enjoin threatened injury, the showing made by Nebraska might possibly be insufficient. But Wyoming v. Colorado . . .
indicates that where the claims to the water of a river exceed the
115 supply a controversy exists appropriate for judicial determination.
Justice Douglas' definition of ripeness is a limited extension of the concept. It would not help any state seeking an equitable apportionment to
fend off future diversion proposals. There would have to be, at a minimum, a diversion project that posed some immediate threat to the interests of other states.
Once the Court accepts original jurisdiction and appoints a master
to take the evidence, the issue becomes what law to apply. The Court
initially rejected local law as the basis for an apportionment, then accepted it as the basis among states that followed the same law, and finally
downgraded local law to a "guiding principle." Fair allocation rather
than consistency with locally generated expectations ultimately became
the touchstone of equitable apportionment. Although the Court has
113 Four years later, the Court applied its high standards of injury to a familiar western water
law doctrine, and dismissed a suit by Washington against Oregon because the former's call would be
futile. Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517 (1936).
114 325 U.S. 589 (1945).
115 Id. at 618.
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never been very precise about the source of the law of equitable apportionment, its early decision makes it clear that the grant of original jurisdiction requires a federal common law and a federal statutory law that
will not allow one state to use its law to gain an unfair advantage over
another. 1 6 The use of local law as a basis for allocation is thus not compelled by the Constitution, and it might be unconstitutional to rely exclusively on local law. Local law may, however, serve as a source of
principles to apply since a federal common law must, of course, examine
the most relevant sources
of substantive law, and in our federal system
17
that will be state law.'
In the 1920s and 1930s, the Court seemed to adopt a simple rule or
set of rules: Appropriation among prior appropriation jurisdictions and
riparian rights among prior riparian jurisdictions. 11 8 But, this was an
overly simplistic assumption in light of the decisions that the Court was
rendering. The cases consistently made it clear that the Court was not
bound by local law and could refuse to apply local laws in situations
where it determined that other states would be deprived of water to protect excess claims. The Court first refused to follow the strict common
law rules of riparian rights in situations where proposed consumptive
uses would have been flatly prohibited. Finally, in Nebraska v. Wyoming,1 9 the Court adopted the current open-ended standard of equitable
apportion:
So far as possible those established uses should be protected though
strict application of the priority rule might jeopardize them. Apportionment calls for the exercise for an informed judgment of consideration of many factors. Priority of appropriation is the guiding principle.
But physical and climatic conditions, the consumptive use of water in
the several sections of the river, the character and rate of return flows,
the extent of established uses, the availability of storage water, the
practical effect of wasteful uses on downstream areas, the damage to
upstream areas as compared to the benefits to downstream areas if20a
limitation is imposed on the former - these are all relevant factors.1
Nebraska v. Wyoming is usually cited for the proposition that equality among states does not permit adherence to local law even among
states that have basically the same water law. Actually, the doctrine was
formally originated in the earlier case of Connecticut v. Massachusetts.
However, read carefully, Nebraska v. Wyoming represents a sensitive effort to fashion a law of equitable apportionment that gives great, but not
116 See Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922).
117 See Tarlock, supra note 108, at 394-402.
118 See Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336
(1931).
119 352 U.S. 589 (1945).
120 Id. at 618.
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controlling, weight to local water law. The Court's function is not to
depart from local law and divide the waters by judicial fiat, but rather to
rub off its rough edges in situations where substantial prejudice to another state would result from the application of a local law, even if both
states follow the same rule. The doctrine seems to contain the root principle that "a State may not preserve solely for its own inhabitants natural
In short, the Supreme
resources located within its own borders."''
Court has now linked the policies underlying equitable apportionment to
those underlying the dormant or negative commerce clause.
The Court has recently announced a decision in an equitable apportionment case that has significant implications for state efforts to prevent
water raids.' 22 The opinion can be read both as a reaffirmation of Nebraska v. Wyoming or as an indication that the Court is willing to break
new ground to increase the conditions that must be met before a state can
refuse to share common resources. Colorado v. New Mexico arose from
an attempt by the state of Colorado to bump the priorities of a marginal
irrigation district in New Mexico in favor of new industrial development
upstream on an interstate stream. The special master rejected a strict
application of prior appropriation and balanced the equities in favor of
the new, upstream use. In its initial opinion, the Court agreed with the
master in theory and added a new standard to the law of equitable apportionment. If the upstream state can demonstrate by clear and convincing
evidence that the equities favor bumping existing uses, it may be able to
prevail because "an important consideration is whether the existing users
could offset the diversion by reasonable conservation measures to prevent
waste." 1 2 3 The case was remanded to the master for more specific findings to determine if the new conservation duty should be invoked.
The requirement that a state take reasonable conservation measures
to preserve its priority is not part of either the law of prior appropriation
or riparian rights in any meaningful way. Many argue that the law
should encourage conservation, and Colorado v. New Mexico I broke
new ground by applying the argument that conservation duties must be
incorporated into the law of equitable apportionment. The radical nature of the decision was apparently too much for a majority of the
Court. 24 Colorado v. New Mexico II returned to the rule of Wyoming v.
Colorado and protected New Mexico's priority. Writing for the majority,
Justice O'Connor concluded that Colorado had failed to demonstrate by
clear and convincing evidence that the diversion should be allowed. The
121 Idaho ex reL Evans v. Oregon, 462 U.S. 1017, 1023 (1983).
122 Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176 (1982)[hereinafter cited as Colorado v. New Mexico

4.
123 Id at 188.

124 See Colorado v. New Mexico, 463 U.S. 1204 (1984)[hereinafter cited as Colorado v. New
Mexico Il].
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Court had announced this standard in the previous opinion, but Justice
O'Connor tightened the standard by requiring a guarantee that the diverting state will bare all of the risks of an erroneous diversion. On one
level, the Court's placement of the burden of bumping existing uses on
the initiating state returns the law of equitable apportionment to preNebraska v. Wyoming standards. On another level, however, the decision opens up new possibilities for states wanting to claim water for new
uses and places new risks on states seeking to protect existing uses. Colorado v. New Mexico 11 did not reject the possibility that the conservation
duty imposed in Colorado v. New Mexico I might be applied in more
appropriate cases. In the end, Colorado seems to have lost because it had
not done the comprehensive planning necessary to justify the new use.
The lesson of the cases is that states must undertake extensive studies to
justify the water uses claimed in an equitable apportionment action and
must make some showing that they are taking steps to manage their resources efficiently. As previously mentioned, the Court has recently
joined the law of equitable apportionment with the policies underlying
the dormant or negative commerce clause. The end result is that states
may not only have to justify the need for the water, but now must show
that they have and are taking reasonable steps to allocate available supplies fairly and efficiently.
All in all, Colorado v. New Mexico 11 read with prior equitable apportionment cases is good news for the Great Lakes States. It contains
the basis for an argument that existing in situ uses should be preserved.
Under the common law of riparian rights, water need not be put to a
beneficial use to exercise a right. Thus, the Great Lakes States have, in
effect, a prior in situ use. The use takes on a further justification from the
realization that the Great Lakes ecosystem requires to a large extent
preservation of the status quo. States and other users that seek to use
Great Lakes water out of the Basin will have a high burden. They may
have to demonstrate that they had exhausted all efforts to conserve existing resources and may, perhaps, be required to defend out-of-basin diversions by at least a rough cost-benefit analysis - something that will not
be easy to do. The Court has previously realized that the highest value of
a stream may be for in situ use so there is a precedent upon which future
Great Lakes preservation efforts can build.125
D. Interstate Compacts
Article I, section 10, clause 3 of the United States Constitution allows states to enter into interstate compacts with the consent of Congress. Compacts have been frequently used as a substitute for equitable
apportionment actions or to supplement them. They offer two major ad125
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vantages over adjudication. First, water may be allocated in advance of
demand in situations where a court would dismiss the action as not ripe.
Compact negotiations offer some states a better chance to protect their
interests. Second, there are no limits on the relevant factors that may be
taken into account compared to an equitable apportionment action
which focuses primarily on the scope of existing uses. Compacts require
a negotiation among all potential signatory states and approval by Congress. Thus, compacts that touch on sensitive issues may be difficult to
negotiate. Compacts are usually negotiated only to avoid a worse fate
(an adverse equitable apportionment action) or to gain a major advantage
(federal funding of storage reservoirs, for example.)
The Great Lakes States negotiated a compact in 1955.126 The Great
Lakes Basin Compact creates a commission with the power to collect
data, develop Basin plans, recommend water resources policies and requires that each state "consider" any commission recommendations on a
diversion of waters either into or out of the Basin. However, the compact provides no binding regulation of proposed diversions.
The law of interstate compacts is still evolving as there has not been
much litigation over them. Although there is some debate about the issue, the consensus is that congressional approval of a compact makes
interpretation of the compact a federal question.27 There remain many
unresolved issues about compacts. One-consequence is clear: state water
rights holders are bound by compact allocations and may have to forego
amounts of water perfected under state law so that the state can satisfy
its compact obligations."' z This rule has been applied in both prior appropriation and riparian jurisdictions. 129
Compacts offer a major advantage to states that want to limit exports but they also have drawbacks. The advantage is that Congress has
the power to consent to state laws that would otherwise discriminate
against interstate commerce. Consent to a compact has recently been
held to be an exercise of this power. In Intake Water Co. v. Yellowstone
River Compact Comm.,"' ° the court upheld a compact provision that required the consent of all signatory states for any transbasin diversion.
The major disadvantages of a compact are that they are only as good
as the standards of apportionment and the enforcement mechanisms that
they adopt. A vague standard may lead to a lawsuit, and the court may
resolve it by applying the law of equitable apportionment. The Court has
126 Great Lakes Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 90-419, 82 Stat. 414 (1968) (Congressional legislation giving consent to the compact).
127 West Virginia ex reL Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22 (1951).
128 Hinderlider v. LaPlata & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
129 Badgley v. City of New York, 601 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 906
(1980).
130 590 F. Supp. 292 (D. Mont. 1983), appeal denied, 105 S. Ct. 316 (1984).
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recently held that state entry into a compact is presumed to forestall an
equitable apportionment action, but the Court will not presume that the
state waived the right to bring an action if it disagrees with the way in
which the compact is interpreted.13 1 The case also illustrates the
problems of a weak enforcement mechanism. Texas and New Mexico
apportioned the Pecos River by a commission on which the states have
an equal vote and the third member, the federal representative, has no tie
breaking vote. The Court refused to reform the compact to break the
resulting deadlock because a compact is an exercise of Congressional
power to apportion interstate waters. It reasoned that the Court lacks
equitable jurisdiction to reform the compact; it can only interpret what
Congress did. However, the Court allowed Texas to continue its original
jurisdiction action and rejected New Mexico's argument that the compact commission was the exclusive forum for the resolution of disputes.
In contrast, the experience of Delaware River Basin Commission shows
that a the combination of a compact that contains stronger enforcement
powers coupled with pressures for interstate cooperation can be
132
effective.
There are other disadvantages to a compact. For example, the issue
has arisen whether a state may agree to a compact that contains powers
that are inconsistent with its state law. The Supreme Court has held that
this is a federal question and it overruled a state court's decision that
West Virginia lacked the authority to enter into the Ohio River Sanitary
Compact, but the issue is still in doubt.' 33
E.

Water Marketing

In a series of recent decisions the Court has opened up a new antiexport strategy as a way around Sporhase. The strategy is water marketing. The theoretical foundation is a series of cases' 3 4 holding states immune from the dormant or negative commerce clause when they are
market participants as opposed to regulators. The market participation
doctrine is open to challenge because the risk of state exercise of monopoly power is greater when they enter the market directly than when they
legislate and regulate, but the Court continues to adhere to the doctrine.
The doctrine has only been applied to state produced goods made from
raw materials; there is a question of whether it applies to natural re131 Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S 554 (1983).
132 See Weston, Delaware Basin: Courts vs. Compacts; (May 16, 1984) (paper presented at the
ASCE-1984 Spring Convention, Symposium on Social and Environmental Objectives in Water Resources Management: The Court As Water Managers).
133 West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22 (1951).
134 See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976); American Yearbook Co. v.
Askew; 339 F. Supp. 719 (M.D. Fla. 1972), affid. 409 U.S. 104 (1972); and Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447
U.S. 429 (1980).
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135
sources such as water. Language in one opinion would suggest not,
but Justice Stevens' opinion in Sporhase suggests that "the natural resource has some indicia of a good publicly produced and owned in which
a state may favor its own citizens in times of shortage." 136 The issue,
however, remains as to whether any state control over its water resources, even if expressed as "water-marketing" is in fact regulation and
thus not immune from the negative or dormant commerce clause. The
Court recently rejected a half-hearted attempt by New Hampshire to justify a preference for in-state consumers of power generated from the Connecticut River because the state "owned" the river and hence the power.
New Hampshire had not generated the power itself and thus its relationship to the privately generated power was only regulatory.1 37 This case
suggests that the Court will review carefully the state's relationship to
the resource when it invokes the market participation doctrine, especially
when the potential impact on interstate commerce is likely to be
substantial.
South Dakota invoked the market participation doctrine when the
state entered into a contract to sell water stored behind a federal reservoir on the Missouri River to a joint venture seeking to construct a coal
slurry pipeline in Wyoming. The Supreme Court of South Dakota has
questioned the state's ownership of the resource, and its resulting power
to sell, but the issue became moot before judicial resolution when the
project was abandoned.13 8
Montana, however, is moving ahead with an aggressive water marketing program. A recent report defines water marketing as "the transfer of the use and/or title of water from a willing seller to a willing buyer
for a consideration paid. 139 Montana House Bill 680 takes large, but not
small, scale diversions and out-of-basin diversions, out of the traditional
appropriation system and provides that water in excess of 4,000 acre feet
must be leased from the state.
Water marketing is not unknown in the Midwest. The Corps of Engineers has long sold water from its flood control reservoirs, and, as previously discussed, Indiana and Ohio have express statutory authority for
intrastate water marketing. The question, of course, is whether a market
exists to support an aggressive statewide marketing program, questions
of ownership and constitutionality aside.
135 Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980).

136 458 U.S. at 957.
137 New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982).
138 In re State of South Dakota Management Board Approving Water Permit No. 1791-2, 351
N.W.2d 119 (S.D. 1984).
139 STATE OF MONTANA REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON WATER MARKETING TO

THE 49TH LEGISLATURE (January 1985).
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Comprehensive Management Legislation

The first lesson of Sporhase is that simple "me-first" legislation is
not an effective means of preserving state waters from out-of-state uses.
In addition to federal protection, states can take unilateral action
through the enactment of water management programs that make Great
Lakes preservation an integral part of state water management. This is
the deeper lesson of Sporhase and Colorado v. New Mexico II. A properly drafted state management program will allow a state to (1) develop a
comprehensive allocation plan for a reasonable time horizon such as
twenty or thirty years, (2) tie applications for all new major water uses to
the allocation priorities established in the plan, and (3) assert the power
to deny water use allocations which are not consistent with the plan.
Comprehensive planning and management legislation is an effective
exercise of the state's police power to allocate supplies for the present as
well as the future. Although the power has not been exhaustively tested,
it is assumed that a state may prefer future to present uses by denying.
present water use applications to reserve the water for future needs.
When this power is combined with the power to protect the state's physical environment from degradation, a state has wide discretion to chart its
resource destiny. Many of the Great Lakes States have a long tradition
of public water management. For example, they have long established
the state holds its major water resources in trust for the public. 4 ° The
trust is an assertion of the police power. Traditionally, the police power
has been used in the Great Lakes States to recognize public rights of
navigation and recreational use in streams, to preserve the scenic beauty
of special waterways and more recently to promote environmental quality. This tradition establishes that water resources must be shared both
among private claimants and between private users and the state as representative of the public generally. It is a rich foundation on which new
water management efforts can be built.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This paper has reviewed the legal strategies available to the Great
Lakes Basin States to chart the future use of the Great Lakes. The decision in Sporhase v. Nebraska coupled with the possibility that the federal
government will exercise its constitutional power to allocate interstate
waters effectively deprives the states of the exclusive authority to decide
who can have access to the Great Lakes for consumptive withdrawals.
The actual possibility of a congressional apportionment contrary to the
140 The most comprehensive analysis of the law of water management in the Great Lakes
States is UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN & UNITED STATES DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE: A FOUR STATE
COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS OF PRIVATE AND PUBLIC RIGHTS IN WATER AND THE LEVELS
AND AGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT THAT ENUNCIATE THEM

(1961).
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desires of the Basin States is remote, but the possibility of judicial invalidation of state legislation that does little more than to prohibit exports
from the Basin is a real possibility.
To chart the destiny of the Great Lakes, littoral states, in cooperation with Canadian provinces, must unite to develop a common management strategy. Section II of this article provides the starting point for the
development of this strategy. All states and provinces follow the common law of riparian rights. A core concept of riparianism is that those in
the watershed of a watercourse are entitled to benefits of the waters in the
watercourse. The common law initially expressed this policy in the rule
that diversions outside the watershed are per se unreasonable. This rule
is softening in response to the arguments that (1) it promotes inefficient
allocation of resources, and (2) there is no case for following the rule to
its logical conclusion. However, the watershed limitation provides the
conceptual underpinning for state and provincial efforts to regulate withdrawals for out-of-basin use. It expresses the valid idea, especially at the
state level, that littoral states have the primary interest in the allocation
of Great Lakes waters. Section III supports the argument by demonstrating that there are no due process limitations on the power of states to
redefine water rights and to subject the use of water to conditions which
further the public interest. Water management legislation is always challenged as an unconstitutional taking of common law property rights, but
as long as rights based on pre-existing uses are protected and access to
water is not completely foreclosed by the new schemes, states have great
discretion to substitute rights based on permits for common law water
rights.
Section IV describes the federal constraints that state regulatory legislation may face. The federal government has the power to make a congressional apportionment of the Great Lakes, but the major constraint is
the negative commerce clause. This clause may Pe invoked by public and
private parties with the standing to object to a state water management
decision. Federal policy is articulated by judges, not by elected representatives, and the results reached may be contrary to those that Congress would reach. In addition, apportionment actions also pose a threat
to state regulatory programs designed to conserve the waters of the Great
Lakes Basin. For example one littoral state might use the Court's original jurisdiction to secure a decree that would legitimate out-of-basin
exports.
Section V describes five options open to the states to conserve the
Basin waters in a manner consistent with federal law. These are Q) export embargos, (2) even-handed use restrictions, (3) equitable apportionment actions, (4) interstate compacts, and (5) comprehensive
management legislation. These strategies are not mutually exclusive and
in fact they should be combined. No one alone is likely to be effective.
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Export embargos are per se unconstitutional. Even-handed legislation is
less likely to be invalidated, but the scope of state power to prefer in-state
residents remains undefined. Equitable apportionment actions recognize
state rights that must be protected, but the ripeness doctrine precludes
the use of an equitable apportionment action to clarify the rights of the
respective states absent a threat of immediate injury, an unlikely possibility for the foreseeable future. Interstate compacts are superior to equitable apportionment actions, but it generally takes a long time for states to
reconcile the inevitable differences among themselves and agree to a
compact.
For the immediate future, the states must continue to concentrate
on implementing the Great Lakes Charter by enacting management legislation that gives states the power to review all major withdrawals, inand out-of-basin, and to either condition them or prohibit them when
they would interfere with clear state objectives. States that regulate in
the context of comprehensive state water management plans stand a better chance of defending water access restrictions than those that do not.
A consistent theme that emerges from recent cases involving interstate
waters is that courts are becoming less willing to defer to abstract expressions of state interest (especially when it used to block access to interstate
waters) and are increasingly requiring that the state "demonstrate"
through a planning or other process how it came to define its interest.
However, unilateral state action can never immunize the action from
negative commerce clause scrutiny. Ultimately, the states may consider
seeking congressional approval of their export restrictions either in the
form of congressional legislation or congressional approval of an interstate compact that recognizes state power to veto out-of-basin diversions.
The approval of the Great Lakes Charter is the first step in the process. Negotiation and approval of an interstate compact can await the
unilateral implementation of the Charter among the Basin States.

